This paper provides an overview of the various shapes the best- reply multifunctions can take in 2×2×2 trimatrix games. It is shown that, unlike in 2×2 bimatrix games, the best replies to the opponents’ pure strategies do not completely determine the structure of the Nash equilibrium set.

This paper introduces the class of 2 × 2 × 2 trimatrix games with identical anonymous best-replies. For this class a complete classification on the basis of the Nash equilibrium set is provided.

A class of non cooperative games characterized by a `congestion e ect' is studied, in which there exists a strong Nash equilibrium, and the set of Nash equilibria, the set of strong Nash equilibria and the set of strategy pro les maximizing the potential function coincide.The structure of the...

In this paper some new approximate fixed point theorems for multifunctions in Banach spaces are presented and a method is developed indicating how to use approximate fixed point theorems in proving the existence of approximate Nash equilibria for non-cooperative games.

The division of a cake by n players is modeled as a game of timing. We show that such games admit a unique Nash equilibrium.

This paper introduces the class of 2 × 2 × 2 trimatrix games with identical anonymous best-replies. For this class a complete classification on the basis of the Nash equilibrium set is provided.

This paper provides an overview of the various shapes the bestreply multifunctions can take in 2x2x2 trimatrix games. It is shown that, unlike in 2x2 bimatrix games, the best replies to the opponents pure strategies do not completely determine the structure of the Nash equilibrium set