This paper describes a non-cooperative theory of bargaining in stationary markets that provides a generalization of the Nash bargaining solution to coalition formation problems. This generalization prevents outside options from being determined in a circular way and, remarkably, always yields a...

This paper analyzes the implications of right-to-manage wage bargaining between a producers' syndicate and a workers' union representing finite numbers of identical members in a monetary macroeconomic model of the AS-AD type with government activity. At given prices and price expectations,...

We consider the problem of matching a set of medical students to a set of medical residency positions (hospitals) under the assumption that hospitals' preferences over groups of students are responsive. In this context, we study the preference revelation game induced by the student proposing...

This paper analyzes the private provision of public goods where consumers interact within a fixed network structure and may benefit only from their direct neighbors' provisions. We present a proof of the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium for general networks and best-reply...

We introduce a framework for modeling pairwise interactive beliefs and provide an epistemic foundation for Nash equilibrium in terms of pairwise epistemic conditions locally imposed on only some pairs of players. Our main result considerably weakens not only the standard sufficient conditions by...

We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. A security agency operates a network with arc capacities. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a flow that specifies a plan for carrying bads through the network from a base to a...

We study (anti-) coordination problems in networks in a laboratory experiment. Participants interact with their neighbours in a fixed network to play a bilateral (anti-) coordination game. Our main treatment variable is the extent to which players are heterogeneous in the number of connections...

Many social networks have the following properties: (i) a short average distance between any two individuals; (ii) a high clustering coefficient; (iii) segregation patterns; the presence of (iv) brokers and (v) hubs. (i) and (ii) define a small world network. This paper develops a strategic...

A tragedy of the commons appears when the users of a common resource have incentives to exploit it more than the socially efficient level. We analyze the situation when the tragedy of the commons is embedded in a network of users and sources. Users play a game of extractions, where they decide...