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Games with capacity manipulation : incentives and Nash equilibria

Romero-Medina, Antonio; Triossi, Matteo - Departamento de Economía, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - 2011

a necessary and sufficient condition that guarantees the stability of a Nash equilibrium and the strategy-proofness of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009291576

Dominant Strategy Implementation of Bargaining Solutions

Mizukami, Hideki; Wakayama, Takuma - 2020

We consider the problem where agents bargain over their shares of a perfectly divisible commodity. The aim of this paper is to identify the class of bargaining solutions induced by dominant strategy implementable allocation rules. To this end, we characterize the class of dominant strategy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014041039

Existence and indeterminacy of Markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games

Anesi, Vincent; Duggan, John - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 2, pp. 505-525

equilibrium due to Anesi and Seidmann, 2015. We then use this existence result to show that if a weak gradient restriction holds … independence condition holds at almost all alternatives, and equilibrium absorbing sets are dense in the set of alternatives. This …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856695

Double implementation in a market for indivisible goods with a price constraint

Azacis, Helmuts - 2005

and strong Nash equilibrium the set of true envy-free allocations. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011517013

Acyclicity and Singleton Cores in Matching Markets

Romero-Medina, Antonio; Triossi, Matteo - 2013

The absence of simultaneous cycles is a suﬃcient condition for the existence of singleton cores. Acyclicity in the preferences of either side of the market is a minimal condition that guarantees the existence of singleton cores

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014178500

Games with Capacity Manipulation : Incentives and Nash Equilibria

Romero-Medina, Antonio; Triossi, Matteo - 2018

a necessary and sufﬁcient condition that guarantees the stability of a Nash equilibrium and the strategy-proofness of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014225211

The Nash Bargaining Solution is Nash Implementable

Naeve, Jörg - 1998

cannot be implemented in Nash equilibrium. We find this results misleading and discuss how implementability of the Nash …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014070154

Dynamic Games of Common-Property Resource Exploitation When Self-Image Matters

Long, Ngo Van - 2019

are two-fold. Firstly, we investigate how a Nash equilibrium among agents who have moral scruples may ensure that the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012141081

Representation of Effectivity Functions in Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium: A Complete Characterization

Keiding, Hans; Peleg, Bezalel - Økonomisk Institut, Københavns Universitet - 1999

The concept of coalition proof Nash equilibrium was introduced by Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston [1987]. In the present … paper, we consider the representation problem for coalition proof Nash equilibrium: For a given effectivity function … proof Nash equilibrium. It is shown that the effectivity functions which can be represented in coalition proof Nash …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005749558

Two-Agent Nash Implementation : A New Result

Wu, Haoyang - 2011

[Moore and Repullo, Econometrica 58 (1990) 1083-1099] and [Dutta and Sen, Rev. Econom. Stud. 58 (1991) 121-128] are two fundamental papers on two-agent Nash implementation. Both of them are based on Maskin's classic paper [Maskin, Rev. Econom. Stud. 66 (1999) 23-38]. A recent work [Wu, Inter. J....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014182517