We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identitydependent externalities. A concept of conjectural …

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can …

. In particular, it is equivalent to the set of perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston …

I introduce an undominated coalition-proof Nash equilibrium that is unique and is able to select undominated Nash … equilibria in a quasi-supermodular game with a strict single-crossing property and monotonic externalities …

We examine the welfare properties, coalition-proofness and order-theoretical structure of the set of Nash equilibria in … pure strategy games with a-aggregative simple strategic substitutes and monotone a-aggregative externalities. For these … games, we prove the equivalence among the set of Nash equilibria, the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under strong …

bidding stage on the resulting outcomes such as the frequency of grand coalition formation, efficiency, and the distance … the grand coalition. This difference is because those proposers who won the bidding stage in PC-W tend to offer an …