We study how the strength of property rights to individual extractive firms affects a regulator's choice over exploitation rates for a natural resource. The regulator is modeled as an intermediary between current and future resource harvesters, rather than between producers and consumers, as in...

We analyze theoretically an institution called a "limited-tenure concession" for its ability to induce efficient public goods contribution and common-pool resource extraction. The basic idea is that by limiting the tenure over which an agent can enjoy the public good, but offering the...

Credit markets and property rights are fundamental for modern economies, but they also have implications for the commons. Using a dynamic model of competitive resource extraction, we show that improving property right security unambiguously increases conservation incentives, but the effect of...

Property rights are commonly touted as a solution to common pool resource problems. In practice, however, the security of property rights over natural resources varies substantially; this may affect returns to ownership and asset values. We use an analytical model to examine the effects of...