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Gayer, Gabrielle; Persitz, Dotan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 3, pp. 937-969

problem, termed the multi-core, wherein an agent consents to participate in the grand coalition if she can envision a … cooperating with the grand coalition rather than operating alone. An allocation is in the multi-core if all agents consent to … participate in the grand coalition. We provide a theorem characterizing the non-emptiness of the multi-core and show that the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671885

Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks

Agbaglah, Messan; Ehlers, Lars H. - 2010

This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008737140

Overlapping Coalitions, Bargaining and Networks

Agbaglah, Messan; Ehlers, Lars H. - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014190389

Order Matters : On Maskin's Coalition Formation Bargaining Model

Cao, Zhigang; Yang, Xiaoguang - 2011

We first show through a counter-example that the existence result of Maskin: Bargaining, coalitions and externalities, Presidential address of the Econometric Society, 2003] does not extend beyond three players.Intuitively, the bargaining may not be able to continue because there may be no...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014176923

Efficient Coalitional Bargaining with Noncontingent Offers II : Sequential Proposer Protocol

Chaturvedi, Rakesh - 2017

equilibrium in pure stationary strategies whose limiting outcome as players get more patient is the core-constrained Nash … Bargaining Solution. For strictly supermodular games, Core is a binding constraint on Nash Bargaining Solution while for the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012963352

A Noncooperative Foundation of the Neutral Bargaining Solution

Kim, Jin Yeub - 2017

This paper studies Myerson's neutral bargaining solution for a class of Bayesian bargaining problems in which the solution is unique. For this class of examples, I consider a noncooperative mechanism-selection game. I find that all of the interim incentive efficient mechanisms can be supported...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012971425

Self-serving use of equity rules in bargaining with asymmetric outside options

Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rilke, Rainer … - 2013

We experimentally investigate multiple notions of equity in ultimatum bargaining with asymmetric outside options. Building on the generalized equity principle formulated by Selten (1978), we derive three different equity rules that can explain 43% of all offers. Our within-subject design further...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191262

Coalitional games with veto players : myopic and rational behavior

Arin, Javier; Feltkamp, Vincent; Montero, María - 2012

This paper studies a noncooperative allocation procedure for coalitional games with veto players. The procedure is similar to the one presented by Dagan et al. (1997) for bankruptcy problems. According to it, a player, the proposer, makes a proposal that the remaining players must accept or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009578191

The coalitional Nash bargaining solution with simultaneous payoff demands

Nieva, Ricardo - 2015

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however, instead of alternating offers, we have simultaneous payoff demands. We focus in the producer game he studies. Each player is chosen with equal probability. If that is the case,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011296159

Self-serving use of equity rules in bargaining with asymmetric outside options : conference paper

Hennig-Schmidt, Heike; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rilke, Rainer … - 2013

We experimentally investigate the relevance of (asymmetric) outside options in ultimatum bargaining. Building on the generalized equity principle formulated by Selten (1978) we derive three different equity rules. These equity rules can explain 43% of all o ers. Our within-subject design allows...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010338950