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A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers

Okada, Akira - In: Games and economic behavior 16 (1996) 1, pp. 97-108

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The stationary equilibrium of three-person coalitional bargaining games with random proposers : a classification

Okada, Akira - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 43 (2014) 4, pp. 953-973

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Stable matching and protocol-free equilibrium

Okada, Akira - In: Games and economic behavior 128 (2021), pp. 193-201

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A dynamic climate negotiation game achieving full cooperation

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Dynamic bargaining with voluntary participation and externalities

Okada, Akira - In: Economic theory 75 (2023) 2, pp. 427-452

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Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game

Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno - 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001387224

Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game : experimental evidence

Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno - In: Games and economic behavior 50 (2005) 2, pp. 278-311

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002612914

Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game : experimental evidence

Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno - 1999

This paper reports the results of experiments involving a 3-person coalition formation game with an ultimatum bargaining character. The grand coalition was always the efficient coalition decision, whereas the values of the 2-person coalitions are varied such that they lead to an efficiency loss...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009711650

Inefficiency and social exclusion in a coalition formation game : experimental evidence

Okada, Akira; Riedl, Arno - 1999 - This version: February, 1999

This paper reports the results of experiments involving a 3-personcoalitionformation game with an ultimatumbargaining character. The grand coalition was always the efficientcoalition,whereas the values of the 2-personcoalitions are varied such that they lead to an efficiency loss inthe range...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301150