We examine whether the strategic delegation problem in interregional negotiations can be solved by a governmental policy. It is well known that when an interregional negotiation is delegated to representatives, each region elects its representative strategically, resulting in inefficient...

We examine the voluntary participation problem in negotiations on providing public goods. In contrast to earlier studies, negotiation is followed by renegotiation in our model. First, players decide whether to participate in a negotiation, and the participants produce a public good. The...

We examine a monopolistic supplier's decision about a pure public good when he/she must negotiate with beneficiaries of the good. In our model, while the level of the public good is decided unilaterally by the supplier, the cost share of the public good is negotiated between the supplier and...

A profit-maximizing public good supplier endogenously determines the level of the public good and simultaneously negotiates with beneficiaries of the good one by one. A pre-negotiation commitment on the production level of the public good by the supplier enhances the internalization of...