Much of the law and economics literature, including Bebchuk (1984) and Reinganum and Wilde (1986), explains settlement failure in bargaining as a consequence of asymmetric information. An alternative, non-strategic explanation found in Shavell (1982) suggests that settlement failure stems from...

We introduce self-serving bias into the Bebchuk (1984) model in which trials result from asymmetric information and characterize the equilibrium. An increase in the self-serving bias of a defendant who receives an offer can, under some circumstances, reduce the incidence of trial. More...

We introduce self-serving bias into the Bebchuk (1984) model in which trials result from asymmetric information and characterize the equilibrium. An increase in the self-serving bias of a defendant who receives an offer can, under some circumstances, reduce the incidence of trial. More...

Arbitration is often used to settle bargaining disputes. Frequently in such disagreements, one party has better information with respect to the surplus to be allocated. This paper considers the impact that the choice of dispute resolution mechanism, conventional or final offer arbitration, has...

As a result of the increasing divorce rate over the past decades, there is an increased need for settlements to divide marital property, to determine child custody and visitation, and to calculate the level of child support payments to be made by the noncustodial parent. Given the growing burden...