This paper proposes a simple framework for analyzing a continuum of monetary policy rules characterized by differing degrees of credibility, in which commitment and discretion become special cases of what we call quasi commitment. The monetary policy authority is assumed to formulate optimal...

This study shows that an expectations-based optimal policy rule has desirable properties in a standard macroeconomic model incorporating a cost channel for monetary disturbances and inflation rate expectations that are partly backwardlooking. Specifically, optimal monetary policy under...

This paper considers the optimal degree of monetary-discretion when the central bank conducts policy based on its private information about the state of the economy and is unable to commit. Society seeks to maximize social welfare by imposing restrictions on the central bank's actions over time,...

The presence of the lagged shadow policy rate in the interest rate feedback rule reduces the government spending multiplier nontrivially when the policy rate is constrained at the zero lower bound (ZLB). In the economy with policy inertia, increased inflation and output due to higher government...

This note summarizes the outline of "money-financed policy." We review some policies for improving fiscal balance, and insist that money-financed policy has the greatest potential to increase social welfare as compared to other policies.Also, we show the effect of money-financed policy on GDP...

The effectiveness of forward guidance depends on the credibility of the central bank. This paper sheds light on the credible forward guidance that a central bank can offer by solving for the whole set of sustainable sequential equilibrium (SSE) in a canonical New Keynesian model with...

This paper examines the conduct of optimal monetary and macro-prudential mandates in a behavioural bounded rationality framework with a financial friction in form of the collateral constraint. A mandate framework is designed where each macroeconomic regulator is assigned a distinct objective...

This paper examines whether reputation concerns can induce the central bank to implement the time-inconsistent optimal monetary policy in a standard New Keynesian model. The forward-looking nature of this model is in this respect interesting on two accounts: first, it worsens the...

In this paper we adopt a Bayesian approach towards the estimation of the monetary policy preference parameters in a general equilibrium framework. We start from the model presented by Smets and Wouters (2003) for the euro area where, in the original set up, monetary policy behaviour is described...