This paper considers a model of economic network characterized by an endogenous architecture and frictions in the relations among agents as described in Bala and Goyal (2000). We propose a similar network model with the difference that frictions in the relations among agents are endogenous....

This paper considers a communication network characterized by an endogenous architecture and an imperfect transmission of information as in Bala and Goyal (2000). We propose a similar network's model with the difference that it is characterized by an endogenous rate of information decay....

This paper considers a simple communication network characterized by an endogenous architecture and an imperfect transmission of information. We analyze the process of network formation in a dynamic framework where self - interested individuals can form or delete links and, occasionally, are...

This paper considers a communication network characterized by an endogenous architecture and an imperfect transmission of information as in Bala and Goyal (2000). We propose a similar network's model with the difference that it is characterized by an endogenous rate of information decay....

This paper considers a model of economic network characterized by an endogenous architecture and frictions in the relations among agents as described in Bala and Goyal (2000). We propose a similar network model with the difference that frictions in the relations among agents are endogenous....

This paper considers a simple communication network characterized by an endogenous architecture and an imperfect transmission of information. We analyze the process of network formation in a dynamic framework where self – interested individuals can form or delete links and, occasionally, are...

We generalize results on the monotocity of equilibria for network games with incomplete information.In those games players know the stochastic process of network formation and their own degree in the realized network, and decide an action depending on the strategic interaction in the network...

In this paper, we describe a series of laboratory experiments that implement specific examples of a more general network structure and we examine equilibrium selection. Specifically, actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, and participants have either complete or...