. Existence encompasses the case of many networks and high network substitutability … cost if the networks are sufficiently close substitutes. Neither demand nor cost information is required. A unique and …

We introduce a new network centrality measure founded on the Gately value for cooperative games with transferable … utilities. A directed network is interpreted as representing control or authority relations between players-constituting a … hierarchical network. The power distribution embedded within a hierarchical network can be represented through appropriate TU …

complex networks have been important research topics. In the inter-firm innovation network, it is a typical game behavior for …As computer science and complex network theory develop, non-cooperative games and their formation and application on …-firm innovation network. We build an extended inter-firm n-player game based on nonidealized conditions, describe four investment …

We consider a communications network in which users transmit beneficial information to each other at a cost. We …

alternative network structures (not just sub-networks) can and should influence the allocation of value among players on any given …Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network … structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of …

A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. Examples of … such networks are exchange networks, communication networks, disease transmission networks, control networks etc. For every … symmetric network we define a cooperative transferable utility game that measures the power of each coalition of positions in …

In this paper, we develop a new game theoretic network centrality measure based on the Shapley value. To do so, we …

We study fundamental properties of monotone network enterprises which contain public vertices and have positive and …

network structure and we examine equilibrium selection. Specifically, actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic … complements, and participants have either complete or incomplete information about the structure of a random network. Since … networks, such as connectivity, clustering, and the degree of the players, help to predict informed behavior in the lab. People …