This paper develops a theory of oligopoly and markups in general equilibrium. Firms compete in a network of product market rivalries that emerges endogenously out of the characteristics of the products and services they supply. My model embeds a novel, highly tractable and scalable demand system...

Central features of today’s electronic communications markets are complementarities between the different layers of the value chain, substitutability between some applications, network effects in the provision of content and services, two-sided business models that partly involve indirect...

This article studies incentives for a premium provider (Superstar) to offer exclusive contracts to competing platforms mediating the interactions between consumers and firms. When platform competition is intense, more consumers subscribe to the platform hosting the Superstar exclusively. This...

There are two “Big Tech” bills currently being considered by Congress (the American Innovation and Choice Online Act and the Open App Markets Act) whose purpose is to limit competitively harmful “self-preferencing” practices by dominant tech platforms. A natural question regarding these...

Das Internet ist stark durch Wettbewerb zwischen Plattformen geprägt, welche potenzielle Tauschpartner zusammenbringen. Die Konkurrenz zwischen solchen mehrseitigen Plattformen und die Marktkonzentration wird maßgeblich bestimmt durch (1) die Stärke der indirekten Netzeffekte, (2) das Ausmaß...