In this paper we study the effects of institutional constraints on stability, efficiency and network formation. More precisely, an exogenous "societal cover" consisting of a collection of possibly overlapping subsets that covers the whole set of players and such that no set in this collection is...

We consider a natural generalization of Jackson and Wolinsky's (J Econ Theory 71:44- 74, 1996) connections model where the quality or strength of a link depends on the amount invested in it and is determined by a non-decreasing function of that amount. The information that the nodes receive...

In this paper we study the effects of institutional constraints on stability, efficiency and network formation. More precisely, an exogenous "societal cover" consisting of a collection of possibly overlapping subsets that covers the whole set of players and such that no set in this collection is...

We complete the extension of the results on efficiency in the seminal connections model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), partially addressed in previous papers. In a model where both nodes and links are heterogeneous, we prove that efficiency is reached by networks with a unique non-trivial...