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Virtual implementation by bounded mechanisms : complete information

Jain, Ritesh; Lombardi, Michele - 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012404658

Recent results on implementation with complete information

Dutta, Bhaskar - In: Social design : essays in memory of Leonid Hurwicz, (pp. 249-260). 2019

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012061489

Procedurally fair implementation under complete information

Korpela, Ville - In: Journal of mathematical economics 77 (2018), pp. 25-31

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012105424

Rationalizable implementation in finite mechanisms

Chen, Yi-chun; Kunimoto, Takashi; Sun, Yifei; Xiong, Siyang - In: Games and economic behavior 129 (2021), pp. 181-197

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012819869

Continuous virtual implementation : complete information

Jain, Ritesh; Lombardi, Michele - In: Journal of mathematical economics 99 (2022), pp. 1-10

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013365545

Rationalizable implementation of social choice functions : complete characterization

Xiong, Siyang - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 18 (2023) 1, pp. 197-230

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014245406

Maskin meets Abreu and Matsushima

Chen, Yi-chun; Kunimoto, Takashi; Sun, Yifei; Xiong, Siyang - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 4, pp. 1683-1717

The theory of full implementation has been criticized for using integer/modulo games, which admit no equilibrium (Jackson (1992)). To address the critique, we revisit the classical Nash implementation problem due to Maskin (1977, 1999) but allow for the use of lotteries and monetary transfers as...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013472500

Costly participation in voting and equilibrium abstention : a uniqueness result

Adachi, Takanori (contributor) - In: Economics bulletin : EB (2004)

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003071542

Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent

Corchón, Luis C.; Triossi, Matteo - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003822584

Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent

Corchón, Luis C.; Triossi, Matteo - In: Social choice and welfare 36 (2011) 2, pp. 179-198

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008839664