Schelling (1969, 1971a,b, 1978) considered a simple proximity model of segregation where individual agents only care about the types of people living in their own local geographical neighborhood, the spatial structure being represented by one- or two-dimensional lattices. In this paper, we argue...

Motivated by trying to better understand the norms that govern pedestrian traffic, I study symmetric two-player coordination games with independent private values. The strategies of "always pass on the left" and "always pass on the right" are always equilibria of this game. Some such games,...

Schelling (1969, 1971a,b, 1978) considered a simple proximity model of segregation where individual agents only care about the types of people living in their own local geographical neighborhood, the spatial structure being represented by one- or two-dimensional lattices. In this paper, we argue...

Schelling (1969, 1971a,b, 1978) considered a simple proximity model of segregation where individual agents only care about the types of people living in their own local geographical neighborhood, the spatial structure being represented by one- or two-dimensional lattices. In this paper, we argue...

We study strategic negotiation models featuring costless delay, general recognition procedures, endogenous voting orders, and finite sets of alternatives. Two examples show: 1. non-existence of stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium (SSPE). 2. the recursive equations and optimality conditions...

Rating systems not only provide information to users but also motivate the rated agent. This paper solves for the optimal (effort-maximizing) rating system within the standard career concerns framework. It is a mixture two-state rating system. That is, it is the sum of two Markov processes, with...

We study strategic negotiation models featuring costless delay, general recognition procedures, endogenous voting orders, and finite sets of alternatives. Two examples show: 1. non-existence of stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium (SSPE). 2. the recursive equations and optimality conditions...

We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of equilibria with only two active players in the all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities. This condition shows that the generic equilibrium of the standard all-pay auction is robust to the...

We examine the impact of ambiguity on economic behaviour. We present a relatively non-technical account of ambiguity and show how it may be applied in economics. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing...

We present a non-technical account of ambiguity in strategic games and show how it may be applied to economics and social sciences. Optimistic and pessimistic responses to ambiguity are formally modelled. We show that pessimism has the effect of increasing (decreasing) equilibrium prices under...