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There are situations in which competitors ally to pursue a common objective. This simultaneous presence of cooperation and competition is called coopetition and we study it theoretically and experimentally in a group contest setup. More concretely, we analyze a group contest with a new sharing...
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Many decisions taken in legislatures or committees are subject to lobbying efforts. A seminal contribution to the … literature on vote-buying is the legislative lobbying model pioneered by Groseclose and Snyder (1996), which predicts that … also provide supporting evidence for most comparative statics predictions of the legislative lobbying model with respect to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012035706
We model competing groups when players' values for winning are private information, each group's performance equals the best effort ("best shot") of its members, and the group with the best performance wins the contest. At the symmetric equilibrium of symmetric contests, increasing the number of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014142038
I analyse a group contest in which groups decide over two dimensions of membership-exclusivity: whether a member is allowed to join the group at all, and whether this member is allowed to join another group as well. If the prize is mostly private, group leaders do not offer membership in...
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clarify how stake asymmetry, lobbying-skill asymmetry and return to lobbying effort determine the relative desirability, from …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013320341
I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012886568
We investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battles may have different values. Two players allocate a fixed budget across battlefields and each battlefield is won by the player who allocates the most to that battlefield. The winner of the game is the player...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010224988