Showing 1 - 10 of 5,065
We address the scheduling problem of reordering an existing queue into its efficient order through trade. To that end …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012720655
This paper explores the sale of an object to an ambiguity averse buyer. We show that the seller can increase his profit by using an ambiguous mechanism. That is, the seller can benefit from hiding certain features of the mechanism that he has committed to from the agent. We then characterize the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010399062
This paper studies efficient partnership dissolution with ex post participation constraints in a setting with interdependent valuations. We derive a sufficient condition that ensures the existence of an efficient dissolution mechanism that satisfies Bayesian incentive compatibility, ex post...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012718977
We introduce intention-based social preferences into a mechanism design framework with independent private values and quasilinear payoffs. For the case where the designer has no information about the intensity of social preferences, we provide conditions under which mechanisms which have been...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010354632
We address the scheduling problem of reordering an existing queue into its efficient order through trade. To that end …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003341369
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003974427
We study optimal auctions in a symmetric private values setting, where bidders have signaling concerns: they care about winning the object and a receivers inference about their type. Signaling concerns arise in various economic situations such as takeover bidding, charity auctions, procurement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015326255
We introduce intention-based social preferences into a Bayesian mechanism design framework. We first show that, under common knowledge of social preferences, any tension between material efficiency, incentive compatibility, and voluntary participation can be resolved. Hence, famous impossibility...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009743166
Potential bidders respond to a seller’s choice of auction mechanism for a common-value or affiliated-values asset by endogenous decisions whether to incur an information-acquisition cost (and observe a private estimate), or forgo competing. Privately informed participants decide whether to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014177982
We analyze the doping behavior of heterogeneous athletes in an environment of private information. In a n-player strategic game, modeled as an all-pay auction, each athlete has private information about his actual physical ability and choses the amount of performance-enhancing drugs. The use of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009772194