We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can …

We examine the welfare properties, coalition-proofness and order-theoretical structure of the set of Nash equilibria in … pure strategy games with a-aggregative simple strategic substitutes and monotone a-aggregative externalities. For these … games, we prove the equivalence among the set of Nash equilibria, the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria under strong …

that the efficient coalition structure is stable in terms of the coalition formation theory. The problem of coalition … that a certain equilibrium of this game corresponds to the gamma-core assumption that when a coalition forms the remaining … players form singletons, and that the grand coalition is an equilibrium coalition structure …

bidding stage on the resulting outcomes such as the frequency of grand coalition formation, efficiency, and the distance … the grand coalition. This difference is because those proposers who won the bidding stage in PC-W tend to offer an …

frequency of the grand coalition formation, the higher efficiency, and the allocation belonging to the bargaining set is …

We consider a standard coalitional bargaining game where once a coalition forms it exits as in Okada (2011), however … chosen with equal probability. If that is the case, she can choose any coalition she belongs to. However, a coalition can …

externalities. In this family, games differ by the size of maximum coalition, partitions and by coalition structure formation rules … suggested finite game includes a family of nested simultaneous non-cooperative finite games with intra- and inter-coalition … game in the family has an equilibrium in mixed strategies with possibly more than one coalition. The results of the game …

The paper studies when efficient allocations are implementable via coalition-proof mechanisms. When ambiguous … implementable via interim coalition incentive compatible mechanisms if and only if the prior distribution of agents’ types satisfies … the Coalition Beliefs Determine Preferences (CBDP) property. When the CBDP property holds, these mechanisms can be …