We develop tests for common values at first-price sealed-bid auctions. Our tests are nonparametric, require observation only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the winner’s curse arises only in common values auctions. The tests build on recently developed...

We develop tests for common values at first-price sealed-bid auctions. Our tests are nonparametric, require observation only of the bids submitted at each auction, and are based on the fact that the "winner's curse" arises only in common values auctions. The tests build on recently developed...

We propose a novel methodology for nonparametric identification of first-price auction models with independent private values, which accommodates auction-specific unobserved heterogeneity and bidder asymmetries, based on recent results from the econometric literature on nonclassical measurement...

We propose a novel methodology for nonparametric identification of first-price auction models with independent private values, which accommodates auction-specific unobserved heterogeneity and bidder asymmetries, based on recent results from the econometric literature on nonclassical measurement...

We propose using cyclic monotonicity, a convex-analytic property of the random utility choice model, to derive bounds on counterfactual choice probabilities in semiparametric multinomial choice models. These bounds are useful for typical counterfactual exercises in aggregate discrete-choice...

We show how to construct bounds on counterfactual choice probabilities in semiparametric discrete-choice models. Our procedure is based on cyclic monotonicity, a convex-analytic property of the random utility discrete-choice model. These bounds are useful for typical counterfactual exercises in...