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Equivalence and invariance of the index and degree of Nash equilibria

Govindan, Srihari - In: Games and economic behavior 21 (1997) 1, pp. 56-61

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001232547

A global Newton method to compute Nash equilibria

Govindan, Srihari; Wilson, Robert - In: Journal of economic theory 110 (2003) 1, pp. 65-86

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001767022

Stability and the chain store paradox

Govindan, Srihari - In: Journal of economic theory 66 (1995) 2, pp. 536-547

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001187128

Stability and the chain store paradox

Govindan, Srihari - 1992

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013452754

An equivalent definition of stable equilibria

Govindan, Srihari; Mertens, Jean-François - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 32 (2003) 3, pp. 339-357

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002119143

A note on the equilibrium existence problem in discontinuous games

Barelli, Paulo; Meneghel, Idione - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 81 (2013) 2, pp. 813-824

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009752290

A note on the equilibrium existence problem in discontinuous games

Barelli, Paulo; Soza, Idione - 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009563433

Subgame‐perfect equilibrium in games with almost perfect information : dispensing with public randomization

Barelli, Paulo; Duggan, John - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1221-1248

Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806463