Introduction to Strategic Form Games -- Dominance -- Rationalizability -- Nash Equilibrium -- Perfect Equilibrium -- Evolutionary Stable Strategies -- Correlated Equilibrium -- Bayesian Nash Equilibrium -- Introduction to Extensive Form Games -- Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium -- Sequential...

Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE...

This chapter of the Handbook of Game Theory (Vol. 3) provides an overview of the theory of Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The starting-point is the rationalistic approach to games and the question whether there exists a convincing, self-enforcing theory of rational behavior in...

In this paper we consider the linear quadratic differential game for descriptor systems that have index one. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of an open-loop Nash equilibrium