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Norde et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent. A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a...
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Norde et al.[Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent. A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064986
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Some new axiomatic characterizations and recursive formulas of the Shapley value are presented. In the results, dual games and the self-duality of the value implicitly play an important role. A set of non-cooperative games which implement the Shapley value on the class of all games is given
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