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Communication in cournot oligopoly
Goltsman, Maria; Pavlov, Gregory - 2012
We study communication in a static Cournot duopoly model under the assumption that the firms have unverifiable private … can communicate through a third party, communication can be informative even when it is not substantiated by any … commitment or costly actions. We exhibit a simple mechanism that ensures informative communication and interim Pareto dominates …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009633349
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Equilibrium selection in experimental cheap talk games
Groot Ruiz, Adrian de; Offerman, Theo; Onderstal, Sander - 2015
In the past, many refinements have been proposed to select equilibria in cheap talk games. Usually, these refinements were motivated by a discussion of how rational agents would reason in some particular cheap talk games. In this paper, we propose a new refinement and stability measure that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477113
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Meaning and credibility in experimental cheap‐talk games
Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 9 (2018) 3, pp. 1453-1487
We design experimental games to evaluate the predictive power of the first cheap‐talk refinement, neologism‐proofness. In our first set of treatments designed to evaluate the refinement with its usual emphasis on literal meanings, we find that a fully revealing equilibrium that is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011994751
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Hierarchical cheap talk
Ambrus, Attila; Azevedo, Eduardo M.; Kamada, Yuichiro - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 8 (2013) 1, pp. 233-261
example because they have to obey institutionalized communication protocols. We assume that all involved in the communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011686974
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Strategic reasoning in persuasion games : an experiment
Li, Ying Xue; Schipper, Burkhard - 2018
We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender (e.g., a seller) with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (e.g., about the quality of a product) to a receiver (e.g., a buyer). Various theoretical solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011811807
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Lying About What You Know or About What You Do?
Serra-Garcia, Marta; Damme, Eric E. C. van; Potters, … - 2011
We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one-shot 2-person public good …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014196597
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Lying About What You Know or About What You Do?
Serra-Garcia, Marta; Damme, Eric E. C. van; Potters, … - 2015
We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one-shot 2-person public good …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014165459
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Strategic Reasoning in Persuasion Games : An Experiment
Li, Ying Xue - 2020
We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender (e.g., a seller) with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (e.g., about the quality of a product) to a receiver (e.g., a buyer). Various theoretical solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852811
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Hierarchical Cheap Talk
Ambrus, Attila - 2018
example, because they have to obey institutionalized communication protocols. We assume that all involved in the communication …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012929289
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Commitments, intentions, truth and Nash equilibria
Schlag, Karl H.; Vida, Péter - 2013
model of communication in games and investigate the importance of when communication takes place. Sending a message before … are believed whenever possible. Applying our results to Aumann's Stag Hunt game we find that communication is useless if …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010200432