Managers of public water companies present themselves and are seen as public servants maximizing public welfare. Because water is rarely allocated through market mechanisms, this maximization requires that managers cooperate in a bureaucratic version of a social dilemma. Members of the...

The purpose of this paper is to model the influence of Kantian moral scruples in a dynamic environment. Our objectives are two-fold. Firstly, we investigate how a Nash equilibrium among agents who have moral scruples may ensure that the exploitation of a common property renewable resource is...

The purpose of this paper is to model the influence of Kantian moral scruples in a dynamic environment. Our objectives are twofold. Firstly, we investigate how a Nash equilibrium among agents who have moral scruples may ensure that the exploitation of a common-property renewable resource is...

We examine a game of harvesting a renewable common resource and investigate the ramifications of competition. We formulate the problem as an impulse control game between two competing harvesters and devise a new formulation of closed-loop impulse control strategies. In the case of non-zero setup...