Showing 1 - 10 of 17
Non-cooperative games are mathematical models of interactive strategic decision situations. In contrast t o cooperative models, they build on the assumption that all possibilities for commitment and contract have been incorporated in the rules of the game. This contribution describes the main...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014142630
We describe non-cooperative game models and discuss game theoretic solution concepts. Some applications are also noted. Conventional theory focuses on the question ‘how will rational players play?', and has the Nash equilibrium at its core. We discuss this concept and its interpretations, as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013040009
This chapter of the Handbook of Game Theory (Vol. 3) provides an overview of the theory of Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The starting-point is the rationalistic approach to games and the question whether there exists a convincing, self-enforcing theory of rational behavior in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024504
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001698386
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001528653
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001533294
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001685776
We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information.The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014196597
We compare communication about private information to communication about actions in a one-shot 2-person public good game with private information. The informed player, who knows the exact return from contributing and whose contribution is unobserved, can send a message about the return or her...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014165459
We examine communication in a 2-player sequential public good game in which the leader has private information about the return from contributing to it. The leader decides first and the follower observes the leader's contribution, before deciding whether or not to contribute. Without...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038656