We say that a society has a weak norm against lying if, all other things being equal, agents rather lie in such a way that they do not get caught. We show that if this is the case then all incentive compatible social choice functions are Bayesian implementable, and furthermore, implementation...

Noting that a full characterization of Nash-implementation is given using a canonical-mechanism and Maskin's theorem (Maskin, 1999) is shown using a mechanism with Saijo's type of strategy space reduction (Saijo, 1988), this paper fully characterizes the class of Nash-implementable social choice...

In this paper, we introduce the weak and the strong notions of partially honest agents (Dutta and Sen, 2012), and then study implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms (Saijo et al., 1996a, 1999) in pure exchange economies. Firstly, assuming that there exists at least one partially...

We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies with free-disposal (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) when agents have weak/strong intrinsic preferences for honesty (Dutta and Sen, 2012). First, the Walrasian rule is shown to be non-implementable when all...

This study experimentally evaluates the performance of partial equilibrium mechanisms when different sectors run their mechanisms separately, despite the existence of complementarity between them.In our simple laboratory experiment setting that includes two sectors, each sector runs the...