We study dynamic price adjustment under imperfect competition when consumers have non-time-separable preferences. In our model an intertemporal link arises in the consumers' maximization problems because current price and firms must take this into account when making their decisions. The main...

We analyze an oligopoly model where firms choose both quantities and access fees. Per unit prices are determined endogenously to equate quantity demanded with quantity supplied at each firm. In a Nash equilibrium of the game played by firms, the per unit prices equal mairginal cost and access...

This paper considers an incumbent firm that is faced with a potential entrant in a vertically differentiated market. It demonstrates than an incumbent firm cannot prevent entry through product proliferation because of a commitment problem.

We study in this paper how the technological flexibility choices and equilibrium configurations depend first on the industry characteristics (demand function and cost parameters specific to the multiproduct flexible technology and to the product dedicated technologies) and, second, on the...

We show that whether observing technological choices made by the competitors is possible or not has significant impact on the equilibrium technological configurations. Depending upon the industry characteristics, the strategic value of technological flexibility may be either positive or...

This paper estimates a model of retail oligopoly where consumers choose between stores using consumer data which specifies the firm operating the chosen store and not the specific store (as is convenient practice for retail surveys). The location and other characteristics of the stores are...

This paper analyzes the problem of altering the cost structure within an oligopoly, in the presence of costs of manipulation. Oligopolistic firms (which differ from each other in production costs) compete a la Cournot in the second stage, taking as given firm-specific taxes or input prices. In...

In a a two period model of strategic entry deterrence (a la Dixit, 1980) where the incumbent firm moves before the entrant by installing capacity for production, in a (perfect) equilibrium excess capacity is not observed under a deterministic demand. The question whether this result remains...

This paper studies a strategic market game where agents fragment their bids on different markets. Simple conditions for existence of an interior equilibrium point are provided. In equilibrium, all agents are active on the same markets and prices are identical across markets, so that all...

We consider the effects of export restraints on price competition in the Hotelling model of horizontal product differentiation. We characterise the Nash equilibrium for all possible values of the quota and compare our results with those of Krishna. We show that a foreign producer would choose a...