This paper explores how costly price adjustment and strategic interaction may cause a leader-follower configuration to arise. While most imperfect models predict that price-setters will synchronize their moves, we show that leadership generates stable staggering.

A two-stage game is used in this paper to model a long-run market with spatially separated producers and with multi-period demands: first, firmas simultaneously and independently invest their capacities; second, after capacities are set up in the first stage and made public, firms engage in a...

This note illustrates the fact that the number of active firms in free entry equilibrium may be largely indeterminate and different levels of positive profits may in many cases be sustained. This is shown to be true, in spite of market contestability, either under Cournot competition or under...

A general notion of market perfect contestability is introduced. It coincides with the definition given by Baumol et al. under Bertrand competition, but is compatible with other forms of competition: Cournot competition as well as monopolistic competition. Using this notion,we illustrate the...

Long-run oligopolistic expansion behavior in an electricity supply market is modeled in this paper.

We develop an equilibrium model of industrial structure in which the organization of firms is endogenous. Differentiated consumer products can be produced either by vertically integrated firms or by pairs of specialized companies. Production of each variety of consumer good requires a unique,...