The paper studies how second degree price discrimination can be implemented in a duopoly with differentiated products. Two firms serve consumers having heterogeneous willingness to pay for the good, willingness to pay being private knowledge. Consumers choose from a menu of tariffs and are...

A two-stage game is used in this paper to model a long-run market with spatially separated producers and with multi-period demands: first, firmas simultaneously and independently invest their capacities; second, after capacities are set up in the first stage and made public, firms engage in a...

It is shown that a fixed cost of nominal price changes enhances the ability of firms to collude in an ologopolistic market for a homogeneous good. Nevertheless, harsh price competition with firms making no profit remains a possible outcome. The analysis focuses on stable symmetric steady states...

We consider a duopoly industry with two separate firms each selling an indivisible product. The joint consumption of these goods has a specific value for the consumers which exceeds the mere addition of utilities when products are consumed in isolation: the higher this excess, the larger the...

Long-run oligopolistic expansion behavior in an electricity supply market is modeled in this paper.

We analyze the effects of technology choices in repeated oligopoly under imperfect monitoring.

This paper studies the effects of 'price-matching' policies in the Bertrand oligopoly model. If one or more consumers incur enforcement costs to utilize price-matching clauses, the unique equilibrium outcome is the competitive one.