In this paper we consider a model of oligopolistic competition where firms make a two-dimensional product line decision. They choose a location in style space, thus, inducing horizontal differentiation, and produce different qualities (a product line) of a given good (vertical differentiation),...

This paper extends a model of symmetric oligopoly with linear demand and constant long-run marginal costs to include more general forms of demand and examines the effects of non-linearity upon dead-weight welfare losses at the monopoly and oligopoly outcomes.

Strategic investment is studied in a model where oligopolists take decisions sequentially. First period investment determines second period wealth and output, and this is anticipated correctly by Cournot oligopolists. In our model with linear technology firms invest less as competition...

This paper shows that the profitability of merger in oligopoly is significantly enhanced if firms delegate the output decision to an agent and then motivate the latter using strategic rent shifting contrcts. Two consequences of increased profitability are that the minimum market share that the...

A two-stage game is used in this paper to model a long-run market with spatially separated producers and with multi-period demands: first, firmas simultaneously and independently invest their capacities; second, after capacities are set up in the first stage and made public, firms engage in a...

An oligopoly with spatially dispersed producers and consumers and with multi-period demands is modeled in this paper.

We examine minimum quality standards (MQS) regulation in vertically differentiated markets with free entry.

Long-run oligopolistic expansion behavior in an electricity supply market is modeled in this paper.

In England and Wales, wholesale electricity is sold in a spot market partly covered by long-term contracts which hedge the spot price. Two dominant conventional generators can raise spot prices to undesirable levels, which is profitable in the absence of contracts. If fully hedged, however, the...

Static oligopoly analysis predicts that if a single firm in Cournot equilibrium were to be constrained to contract its production marginally, its profits would fall. On the other hand, if all the firms were simultaneously constrained to reduce their productino, thus moving the industry towards...