Should a public firm locate close to or far away from a private firm, i.e., is duplication or diversity the optimum policy? We extend the classical Hotelling location game with exogenously fixed prices to the case where consumers' transportation costs are asymmetric, in the sense that it is more...

Two TV channels compete on programming with respect to both time schedule (continuous choice) and programme progile (discrete choice), with a directional constraint concerning time schedule (viewers cannot watch TV before they get home). We show how the relative importance of programme progile...

This paper explores how costly price adjustment and strategic interaction may cause a leader-follower configuration to arise. While most imperfect models predict that price-setters will synchronize their moves, we show that leadership generates stable staggering.

This paper shows that the adoption of flexible manufacturing techniques by firms leads to a tougher price regime. This need not benefit consumers since the tougher regime deters entry and facilitates segmented market structures.

In this paper we consider a model of oligopolistic competition where firms make a two-dimensional product line decision. They choose a location in style space, thus, inducing horizontal differentiation, and produce different qualities (a product line) of a given good (vertical differentiation),...

This paper considers an incumbent firm that is faced with a potential entrant in a vertically differentiated market. It demonstrates than an incumbent firm cannot prevent entry through product proliferation because of a commitment problem.

We study in this paper how the technological flexibility choices and equilibrium configurations depend first on the industry characteristics (demand function and cost parameters specific to the multiproduct flexible technology and to the product dedicated technologies) and, second, on the...

We show that whether observing technological choices made by the competitors is possible or not has significant impact on the equilibrium technological configurations. Depending upon the industry characteristics, the strategic value of technological flexibility may be either positive or...

This paper investigates if, and how, aternative bargaining agentas may sustain (or, emerge) endogenously, under conditions of centralized wage bargaining, in industries with market power. The wage & employment bargains agenta ("Efficient Bargains") is shown to be a strategic device to induce...

The paper studies how second degree price discrimination can be implemented in a duopoly with differentiated products. Two firms serve consumers having heterogeneous willingness to pay for the good, willingness to pay being private knowledge. Consumers choose from a menu of tariffs and are...