Under Cournot and Bertrand cases, cartel stability is investigated in a context of adverse selection, where consumers are imperfectly informed about the products quality. Producers' collusion may be necessary to signal quality via a third-party certification or a price. In particular, cases with...

This paper shows that if domestic firms do not have identical unit costs, then the interplay between the Herfindahl index of concentration and the elasticity of the slope of the demand curve is of major importance in the determination of optimal trade policies. When the demand curve is concave,...

This paper considers an incumbent firm that is faced with a potential entrant in a vertically differentiated market. It demonstrates than an incumbent firm cannot prevent entry through product proliferation because of a commitment problem.

We study in this paper how the technological flexibility choices and equilibrium configurations depend first on the industry characteristics (demand function and cost parameters specific to the multiproduct flexible technology and to the product dedicated technologies) and, second, on the...

We show that whether observing technological choices made by the competitors is possible or not has significant impact on the equilibrium technological configurations. Depending upon the industry characteristics, the strategic value of technological flexibility may be either positive or...

In an oligopoly supergame, firms' actions in prices and quantities are subject to non-negativity constraints. These constraints can obstruct the practicability of optimal punishment (a la Abreu (1986), Lambson (1987), and Hackner (1996)) in sustaining tacit collusion. Noting that the prospect of...

In the framework of symmetric Cournot oligopoly, this paper provides two minimal sets of assumptions on the demand and cost functions that imply respectively that, as the number of firms increases, the minimal and maximal equilibria lead to (i) decreasing industry price and increasing or...

I apply three noncooperative models of coalition formation to a Cournot olygopoly. In each model, each firm has to choose the coalition it wants to belong to. But each of those models is characterised by a different assumption that defines what happens to a coalition from which one or more...

We analyze the strategic pricing and informative advertising decisions made by firms in duopolistic contexts. We show that whether the products are substitutes or complements, these exist strategic settings in which firms keep potential consumers uninformed about their products even if...