In this paper we consider an oligopoly and we are concerned with the effect on the price of Y and the pay-offs/utilities of the buyers and sellers of entry in the market of buyers and/or sellers. Hence our paper is concerned with comparative statics in oligopolistic markets

The model of strategic market games due to Shubik (1973), Shapley (1976) and Shapley and Shubik (1977) is based on the assumption of strategic behavior on the part of buyers and sellers. Unlike Cournot who assumed that buyers are price takers, in strategic market games all the agents are assumed...

In this paper we show that a unique no-trivial equilibrium exists in a successive oligopoly with pure exchange. We also obtain some comparative static results concerning the entry and/or exit of whole-sellers and retailers in the market

The starting point of this paper is the recognition of the fact that a bilateral oligopoly is essentially a non-cooperative game among the agents participating in the market. This leads to our definition of response function for each side of the market. We make appropriate assumptions so that...

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the asymptotic behavior of oligopoly equilibrium in the framework of multilateral exchange when the economy is replicated a finite number of times and show that the sequence of associated price-allocation pair converges to the competitive equilibrium...

We provide a two good model of oligopolistic production and trade with one good being commodity money. There is the usual demand function of the consumers for the produced good that producer-sellers face. Each seller is a budget constrained preference maximizer and derives utility (or...