We revisit the debate on the optimal number of firms in the commons in a differential oligopoly game in which firms are either quantity- or price-setting agents. Production exploits a natural resource and involves a negative externality. We calculate the number of firms maximizing industry...

This paper examines the stability conditions of the equilibria in a market where profit-maximizing and CSR firms coexist in the presence of an environmental externality. An equilibrium in mixed duopoly is stable for low impact of productivity on pollution and high CSR sensitivity to consumer...

We extend the analysis carried out by Valletti (2000) by considering an environmental externality in a vertically differentiated duopoly where firms compete à la Cournot with fixed costs of quality improvement.We show that, if the weight of the external effect is high enough, the resulting...

This paper investigates how CSR firms influence a Cournot oligopoly with pollution. We define as CSR a firm that takes into account not only its profits but also internalises its own share of the externality and is sensitive to consumer surplus. The CSR firm obtains higher profits compared to...

We investigate the feasibility of horizontal mergers in a homogeneous triopoly where firms compete in quantities and production is polluting the environment. We show that the degree of alignment between private and social incentives increases in the intensity of pollution

We modify the vertically differentiated duopoly model by André et al. (2009) replacing Bertrand with Cournot behaviour to show that firms may spontaneously adopt a green technology even in the complete absence of any form of regulation

We examine the relationship between competition and innovation in an industry where production is polluting and R&D aims to reduce emissions ("green" innovation). We present an n-firm oligopoly where firms compete in quantities and decide their investment in "green" R&D. When environmental...