Showing 1 - 10 of 19
This paper explores the application of oblivious equilibrium to concentrated industries. We define an extended notion of oblivious equilibrium that we call partially oblivious equilibrium (POE) that allows for there to be a set of "dominant firms'', whose firm states are always monitored by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013063294
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009788165
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011481371
This paper presents a new approach to modeling transitional dynamics in dynamic models of imperfect competition, a crucial yet often neglected aspect of empirical models in industrial organization that seek to understand market responses to policy and environmental changes. We introduce...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015094887
We analyze investment incentives and market structure under oligopoly competition in service industries with congestion effects. We consider situations where firms compete by simultaneously choosing prices and investments; increasing investment reduces the congestion disutility experienced by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014026413
We analyze investment incentives and market structure under oligopoly competition in industries with congestion effects. Our results are particularly focused on models inspired by modern technology-based services, such as telecommunications and computing services. We consider situations where...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013119404
This paper explores the application of oblivious equilibrium to concentrated industries. We define an extended notion of oblivious equilibrium that we call partially oblivious equilibrium (POE) that allows for there to be a set of "dominant firms'', whose firm states are always monitored by...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459355
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002038559
We describe a two-step algorithm for estimating dynamic games under the assumption that behavior is consistent with Markov Perfect Equilibrium. In the first step, the policy functions and the law of motion for the state variables are estimated. In the second step, the remaining structural...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013218730
We describe a two-step algorithm for estimating dynamic games under the assumption that behavior is consistent with Markov perfect equilibrium. In the first step, the policy functions and the law of motion for the state variables are estimated. In the second step, the remaining structural...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029344