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We consider the joint effect of profit and Pigouvian taxation in a model of imperfect competition. We show that, when both profit taxation and Pigouvian taxation/subsidy are used, the former is no longer neutral. The two fiscal tools are substitutes, and for any profit taxation rate there exists...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014206165
We revisit the debate on the optimal number of firms in the commons in a differential oligopoly game in which firms are either quantity- or price-setting agents. Production exploits a natural resource and involves a negative externality. We calculate the number of firms maximizing industry...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014162788
We characterise the subgame perfect equilibrium of a differential market game with hyperbolic inverse demand where firms are quantity-setters and accumulate capacity over time à la Ramsey. The related Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman are solved in closed form both on infi nite and on finite horizon...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013088836
We propose a simple method for characterising analytically the feedback solution of oligopoly games with capital accumulation à la Solow-Swan. As a result, it becomes possible to contrast the feedback equilibrium against the corresponding one generated by open-loop information. Our method...
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We investigate the possibility of using public firms to regulate polluting emissions in a Cournot oligopoly where production takes place at constant returns to scale and entails a negative environmental externality. We model the problem as a differential game and investigate (i) the Cournot-Nash...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011737230
We propose a simple method for characterising analytically the feedback solution of oligopoly games with capital accumulation à la Solow-Swan. As a result, it becomes possible to contrast the feedback equilibrium against the corresponding one generated by open-loop information. Our method...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011737241