Similar Search Results

Partial cartels and mergers with heterogenous firms : experimental evidence

Gomez-Martinez, Francisco - 2017

A usual assumption in the theory of collusion is that cartels are all-inclusive. In contrast, most real-world collusive agreements do not include all firms that are active in the relevant industry. This paper studies both theoretically and experimentally the formation and behavior of partial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011761059

Mergers in Imperfectly Segmented Markets

Baake, Pio; Wey, Christian - DIW Berlin (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) - 2009

We present a model with firms selling (homogeneous) products in two imperfectly segmented markets (a "high-demand" and a "low-demand" market). Buyers are mobile but restricted by transportation costs, so that imperfect arbitrage occurs when prices differ in both markets. We show that equilibria...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005026827

Chapter 15 Antitrust

Kaplow, Louis; Shapiro, Carl - In: Handbook of law and economics : volume 2, (pp. 1073-1225). 2007

policy. We address four core subject areas: market power, collusion, mergers between competitors, and monopolization. In each …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023495

Chapter 36 Antitrust Policy toward Horizontal Mergers

Whinston, Michael D. - In: Handbook of industrial organization : volume 3, (pp. 2369-2440). 2007

antitrust policy toward horizontal mergers, the area of antitrust that has seen some of the most dramatic improvements in both …, merger laws and enforcement practices, econometric methods for analyzing prospective horizontal mergers, and evidence … concerning the ex post effects of actual horizontal mergers. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024580

Efficient horizontal mergers in polluting industries with Cournot competition

Lambertini, Luca; Tampieri, Alessandro - 2012

We compare a Bertrand with a Cournot duopoly in a setting where production is polluting and exploits natural resources, and firms bear convex production costs. We adopt Dastidar's (1995) approach, yielding a continuum of Bertrand-Nash equilibria ranging above marginal cost pricing also, to show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011734236

Vertical bargaining and retail competition : what drives countervailing power?

Gaudin, Germain - 2017

This paper investigates the effects of changes in retail market concentration when input prices are negotiated. Results are derived from a model of bilateral Nash-bargaining between upstream and downstream firms which allows for general forms of demand and retail competition. Whether...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011654786

Collusive agreements in vertically differentiated markets

Marini, Marco A. - 2017

This paper introduces a number of game-theoretic tools to model collusive agreements among firms in vertically differentiated markets. I firstly review some classical literature on collusion between two firms producing goods of exogenous different qualities. I then extend the analysis to a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660599

Debt, Control, and Collusion

Sokol, D. Daniel - 2021

Partial ownership of stock in multiple competing firms is an important scholarly and policy topic in both corporate and antitrust law. Until now, the discussion has focused on ownership. This essay shifts the debate from a focus on common ownership to a focus on common control. No prior work has...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013236520

A Nash-in-Nash Model of Corporate Control and Oligopolistic Competition under Common Ownership

Vravosinos, Orestis - 2023

This paper proposes a model of corporate control and oligopolistic competition under common ownership. Each firm’s conduct results from Nash bargaining (NB) among shareholders and firms play a Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains. NB encompasses a rich class of models of corporate control under...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014354145

A Tale of Two Networks : Common Ownership and Product Market Rivalry

Ederer, Florian; Pellegrino, Bruno - 2022

We study the welfare implications of the rise of common ownership in the United States from 1994 to 2018. We build a general equilibrium model with a hedonic demand system in which firms compete in a network game of oligopoly. Firms are connected through two large networks: the first reflects...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013314290