This paper analyzes price discrimination of an upstream cartel in the presence of a dominant firm at the retail level. Charging different wholesale prices creates a bond between the upstream cartel and the favored downstream firm. This bond reduces or eliminates this firm's incentives to accept...

This paper analyzes the role of communication between firms in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game in which firms receive an imperfect private signal of a common value i.i.d. demand shock. It is shown that firms can use stochastic, inter-temporal market sharing as a perfect substitute for...

We analyze the impact of increased outside opportunities brought to consumers by improved access to a global market on local mar- ket performance under monopoly vs. oligopoly. If consumers choose once where to buy, we show that under all forms of organizing the local market, increased...

We develop a model of search among substitutes for the best combination of commodity variant and price, in which the structure of search costs can be manipulated by the suppliers of these variants, e.g. by joining an existing market or opening a new one. We analyse the subgame perfect equilibria...

In the period following WW II. until the country accessed the European Union, cartels were legalized in Austria, upon registration with the Austrian Cartel Court. We obtained access to the registration data, and scanned them all towards a microeconomic analysis of contracting behavior between...

Cartels were legal to a large extent in Austria until the country’s EU Accession in 1995. We examine archival material on registered horizontal cartels to learn about their inner working. Applying content analysis to legally binding cartel contracts, we comprehensively document different...