In an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, we compare a Cournot equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium. The Cournot agents trade and invest less than the Walras agents. This generates an inefficiency that does not vanish as the number of Cournot agents tends to infinity. A larger number...

We analyze the principle of comparative advantage when agents in the world market are aware of the influence their individual supply exerts on the equilibrium exchange rate of goods. We show that specialization following comparative disadvantage can be an oligopoly equilibrium in a Ricardian...

In an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, we compare a Cournot equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium. The Cournot agents trade and invest less than the Walras agents. This generates an ineffciency which does not vanish as the number of Cournot agents tends to infinity. A larger number...