This paper studies all‐pay auctions in which there is a buy‐price option for bidders to guarantee purchases at a seller‐specified price. We analyze symmetric increasing bidding equilibria in the first‐ and second‐price all‐pay auctions with the buy‐price option. While the optimal...

When a platform is an optional intermediary, should it require price coherence, i.e., that sellers charge the same price to the platform’s users as they charge their direct customers? If the platform does this, how will it affect consumers’ and overall welfare? In a model leveraging insight...

Two asymmetric potential entrants contemplate entering a new market. Firms differ in their potential profit flows and investment sunk costs. The market demand follows a geometric Brownian motion. This paper shows that under certain parameter conditions, there will be an equilibrium triggered by...

In this paper we study a two-player investment game with a first mover advantage in continuous time with stochastic payoffs, driven by a geometric Brownian motion. One of the players is assumed to be ambiguous with maxmin preferences over a strongly rectangular set of priors. We develop a...

We construct a model of strategic behavior in sequential markets which exhibits a persistent forward price premium. On the spot market, producers wield market power while purchasers are price takers. Producers with forward commitments have less incentive to raise prices on the spot market....

This paper provides a general characterization of subgame-perfect equilibria for a strategic timing problem, where two firms have the (real) option to invest irreversibly in some market. Profit streams are uncertain and depend on the market structure. The analysis of the problem emphasizes its...

Many business opportunities feature second-mover advantages as there are often positive spillovers and externalities from early entrants to followers. We develop a tractable stochastic duopoly entry game with a second-mover advantage. We show that firms engage in a war-of-attrition game with the...

Recent energy shortfalls in renewables-dominated electricity markets call for a mechanism to ensure demand is met under all system conditions. We demonstrate severe shortcomings of an increasingly popular mechanism--reliability options--caused by its interaction with fixed-price forward...

We construct a model of strategic behavior in sequential markets which exhibits a persistent forward price premium. On the spot market, producers wield market power while purchasers are price takers. Producers with forward commitments have less incentive to raise prices on the spot market....

We use a compound option-based structural credit risk model to infer a term structure of banking crisis risk from market data on bank stocks in daily frequency. Considering debt service payments with different maturities this term structure assigns a separate estimator for short- and long-term...