This paper investigates the political incentives for the design of a Pay-as-you-go public pension system in a probabilistic voting model with both far-sighted and myopic agents. People vote for a payroll tax rate determining the size of the pension system and a Bismarckian factor representing...

This chapter provides a review of some implications of demographic shift arising from population aging for fiscal policy, taxation policy, and social security settings. The key implications of population aging that have been forthcoming from the many national and international macroeconomic...

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of altruism on the optimal fiscal policy. The existence of positive bequests links present and future generations in the economy. We show that these altruistic links provide a new role for indirect taxation (consumption and estate taxes) with important...

The rapidly growing national debt in the U.S. since the 1970s has alarmed and intrigued the academic world. Consequently, the concept of dynamic (in)efficiency in an overlapping generations (OLG) world and the importance of the heterogeneous-agents and incomplete markets (HAIM) hypothesis to...

This paper explores the optimal risk sharing arrangement between generations in an overlapping generations model with endogenous growth. We allow for nonseparable preferences, paying particular attention to the risk aversion of the old as well as overall life-cycle risk aversion. We provide a...

The paper evaluates the theoretical literature on public pension schemes. First, the terms pay-as-you-go and capital reserve are made precise. These two systems are then compared, followed by a consideration of their efficiency properties. Thereafter conversion policies are discussed.

Public pension schemes can be designed either as capital reserve systems or as unfunded (or pay-as-you-go) schemes. In the literature it has been alleged that unfunded schemes are intergenerationally efficient in Pareto's sense. Here we show that this holds only if contributions to the system...

This is a postprint of a paper that was published in the Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146, 1990, pp. 640-647

This is a postprint of a paper that was published 1997 in H. Giersch (Ed.) Reforming the Welfare State. Berlin: Springer-Verlag

In earlier literature, the suggested Pareto improvements in pay-as-you-go (PAYG) systems have relied on the presence of externalities or the possibility of intragenerational redistribution. We show that neither assumption is necessary in an economy with intergenerational trade in a fixed factor...