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A Survey of Executive Compensation Contracts in China's Listed Companies

Li, Yubo - 2013

We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than local-government-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cash-based...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013081109

Blockholders on Boards and CEO Compensation, Turnover and Firm Valuation

Agrawal, Anup - 2019

CEO equity incentives, and higher valuations. These effects are substantial and robust. Our findings imply that by making …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012906210

Shareholder Rights, Managerial Incentives, and Firm Value

Zhang, Feng - 2014

This paper investigates interactions between two central corporate governance mechanisms: shareholder rights and managerial ownership. I find that the effect of managerial ownership on firm value crucially depends on shareholder rights. Managerial ownership enhances firm value when shareholder...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068483

Board of director collusion, managerial incentives and firm values

Andergassen, Rainer - 2011

This paper investigates the effects of board of director collusion on managerial incentives and firm values. Recent …-cutting effort and investigate the consequences of and the incentives for coordinating managerial pay among corporate boards. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011734901

New Active Blockholders and Adjustment of CEO relative incentive ratios

Nguyen, Lan Phuong; Galpin, Neal; Twite, Garry - 2021

We study the emergence of blockholders as an important mechanism that corrects deviations from target CEO relative debt-to-equity incentive ratios. We find that a new active blockholder more likely emerges when a firm deviates from target; deviations fall during the period the blockholder owns...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014361720

Blockholder Short-Term Incentives, Structures, and Governance

Song, Fenghua - 2017

public intervention, and finally exit. When the blockholder faces short-term incentives, the threat of public intervention … and exit loses credibility, and management pays little heed to private demands. With two blockholders with heterogeneous … incentive horizons, reduction in public intervention by a blockholder with short-term incentives strengthens public intervention …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012972559

The determinants of the German corporate governance rating

Drobetz, Wolfgang; Gugler, Klaus; Hirschvogl, Simone - 2004

This paper analyzes the determinants of the German corporate governance rating recently developed by Drobetz, Schillhofer, and Zimmermann (2004). We find a non- linear relationship between ownership concentration and the quality of firmlevel corporate governance as measured by the rating. Firms...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011570371

How weak is the weakest-link principle? : on the measurement of firm owners' control rights

Weichenrieder, Alfons J.; Edwards, Jeremy S. S. - 2004

The paper argues that the weakest link principle, which has been widely used as a measure of ultimate owners' control rights, has a number of serious problems. A theoretically more satisfactory method of measuring control rights, based on voting power indices, is proposed, and the different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450369

Incentivizing the Owner : Why Family Firms offer Pay-for-Performance Contracts to their CEOs

Abrardi, Laura - 2019

We study the managers' compensation schemes adopted by publicly listed family firms by means of a theoretical model and an empirical analysis. Existing empirical literature finds puzzling evidence about the structure of family CEOs' pay, which apparently contradicts the fundamental tenets of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012866080

The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium

Chaigneau, Pierre - 2017

We consider a model of CEO selection, dismissal and retention. Firms with larger blockholder ownership monitor more; they get more information about CEO ability, which facilitates the dismissal of low-ability CEOs. These firms are matched with CEOs whose ability is more uncertain. For retention...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012975704