Showing 1 - 10 of 920
This paper analyzes how ownership concentration and managerial incentives influences bank risk for a large sample of US banks over the period 1997-2007. Using 2SLS simultaneous equations models, we show that ownership concentration has a positive total effect on bank risk. This is the result of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013030722
We define annual shareholder meetings as contentious if one or more ballot items are likely to obtain sufficient shareholder votes to induce a firm to implement governance changes. Using a sample of almost 28,000 meetings between 2003 and 2012, we find that abnormal stock returns over the 40-day...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012987700
This paper uses novel data to examine the fleets of corporate jets operated by both publicly traded and privately held firms. In the cross-section, firms owned by private equity funds average 40% smaller fleets than observably similar public firms. Similar fleet reductions are observed within...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013133808
Employee ownership is often used as a reward management tool but also as entrenchment mechanism. This paper develops a model suggesting that employee ownership policy reveals management quality. Good managers would use employee ownership as a reward management tool whereas bad managers would...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125539
This paper studies the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on managerial compensation horizon under common ownership. We find that the predominant governance approach under common ownership is the threat of exit, which inadvertently exacerbates managerial myopia. Hence, common owners tend...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013216166
Previous literature shows that employee ownership can be used as a reward management tool or as entrenchment mechanism. This paper develop a model suggesting that employee ownership policy reveals management quality. Good managers would use employee ownership as a reward management tool whereas...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013128653
We study changes in the design of CEO contracts when firms transition from being public with dispersed ownership to being private with strong principals in the form of private equity sponsors. These principals redesign many, but far from all, contract features. There is no evidence that they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009009486
We find that the presence of independent directors who are blockholders (IDBs) in firms promotes better CEO contracting and monitoring, and higher firm valuation. Using a panel of about 11,500 firm-years with a unique, hand-collected dataset on IDB-identity and a novel instrument, we find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012906210
Firms routinely justify CEO compensation by benchmarking against companies with highly paid CEOs. We examine whether the 2006 regulatory requirement of disclosing compensation peers mitigated firms' opportunistic peer selection activities. We find that strategic peer benchmarking did not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013066379
Firms regularly justify their CEOs' compensation by referencing companies with highly paid CEOs with whom they claim to compete for managerial talent. This paper examines whether the 2006 regulatory requirement of disclosing compensation peers has mitigated firms' opportunistic peer benchmarking...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013068435