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We are concerned with the design of a constitution for a firm - an ex ante contract which assigns residual rights of control (and possibly residual income rights) without reference to the issue to be decided. We focus attention on two polar constitutions: non-profit cooperatives and outside...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012771164
and employees' incentives to invest in human capital. We argue that employee's incentives in human capital investment are …. Ownership provides protections which may improve or dull employees' incentives for human capital investment. When there is …
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The success of mass privatization requires either that new owners are active in corporate affairs or that the original owners sell their shares to those who are willing to be active: voice or exit is necessary. We examine the structure of ownership and the extent of voice and exit in one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014066655
The rapid growth in index funds and significant consolidation in the asset-management industry over the past few decades has led to higher levels of common ownership and increased attention on the topic by academic researchers. A consensus has yet to emerge from the literature regarding the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014422341
This paper provides a theoretical model for explaining the separation of ownership and control in firms. An entrepreneur hires a worker for providing eff ort to complete a project. The worker's eff ort determines the probability that the project is completed on time, but the worker receives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014182283
incentives. Delegating project choice to the manager can alleviate this conflict if managerial private benefits are not too small …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013144213
Purpose: This study explores the probability of expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders in the form of CEO compensation under an imperfect governance institution by using a novel Chinese dataset over 2001-2010.Design/methodology/approach: We use a direct method to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013090224