Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998-2009 is empirically tested. It supports an...

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationships between debts, dividends and ownership concentration. Are these mechanisms substitutable or complementary?We propose a three simultaneous equations system for two samples of Tunisian firms (31 quoted companies 73 non-quoted private firms)...

This research investigates the relationship between corporate block ownership and firm financial leverage. Corporate blockholders, which are nonfinancial firms who hold more than five percent equity in a target industrial firm, can affect the target firm's policies through their business...

This paper focuses on dominant owners' use of leverage to finance their blockholdings and its relationship to dividend policy. We postulate that blockholder leverage may impact payout policy, in particular when earnings are hit by a negative shock. We use panel data for France where blockholders...

This paper focuses on dominant owners' use of leverage to finance their blockholdings and its relationship to dividend policy. We postulate that blockholder leverage may impact payout policy, in particular when earnings are hit by a negative shock. We use panel data for France where blockholders...

In a three-period model with active and passive external corporate governance, this paper studies the endogenous decision of debt and equity financiers on the governance mode and intensity over their debtors, as well as how this may affect the funded firms' financing choice. We show that debt...

Debt ownership by equity-holding managers aligns their incentives more closely with those of creditors, thereby reducing agency costs of debt. We test this hypothesis by examining how terms of bank loans are related to executive pension and deferred compensation, i.e., inside debt held by...

This paper analyzes the relationship between some characteristics of the corporate board and the firm's capital structure in Nepalese listed firms using panel data models. The findings provide some preliminary empirical evidence and seem to suggest that stronger corporate governance practices...

In countries where holding control takes on much relevance it is arguable that capital structure choices are shaped in response to ownership characteristics. These issues are explored in the Italian context being dominated by pyramidal groups and majority-controlled firms. The results show that...