We present a fairly simple, feasible, price-quantity strategic market game for pure-exchange economies with finitely many agents, such that the set of pure Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of competitive equilibria. Our set-up encompasses incomplete, non-convex, non-transitive,...

We show, in the Choquet expected utility model, that prefernece for diversification, that is, convex prefrences, is equivalent to a concave utility index and a convex capacity. We then introduce a weaker notion of diversification, namely "sure diversification". We show that this implies that the...

The aim of this paper is to present Arrow's theorem and more generally the common framework of many results which can be called "Arrovian theorems". One begins by recalling the Condorcet majority rules, and why they fail: the "effet Condorcet". These rules are examples of preference aggregation...

A theory is proposed in which preferences are conditional on reference points. Preferences conditional on any given reference point satisfy the usual assumptions of cunsumer theory. Apart from a continuity condition, the only additional restriction is to rule out cycles of pairwise choice. The...