This paper studies the effects of 'price-matching' policies in the Bertrand oligopoly model. If one or more consumers incur enforcement costs to utilize price-matching clauses, the unique equilibrium outcome is the competitive one.

This paper studies the effects of 'price-matching' policies in the Bertrand oligopoly model. If one or more consumers incur enforcement costs to utilize price-matching clauses, the unique equilibrium outcome is the competitive one.

We conducted an experiment to examine the performance of the bilateral trading institution in GHG emissions trading. First, we found that the efficiency of bilateral trading is quite high, regardless of the disclosure or closure of contracted price and/or marginal abatement cost curve...

The non- ub titution theorem a ert that the choice of technique i independent of pattern of final demand when efficiency prevail a to the u e of a ingle primary factor, say labor, while the a erted con tancy of theinput-output table no longer hold when more than one kind of primary factor i...

The Pigovian rule for the optimal public goods provision with distortionary taxation is given a new interpretation. It relates the Pigovian rule to project evaluation rules in terms of shadow prices. Our formula for the Pigovian rule is compared with that given by existing literature for cases...

The non- ub titution theorem a ert that the choice of technique i independent of pattern of final demand when efficiency prevail a to the u e of a ingle primary factor, say labor, while the a erted con tancy of theinput-output table no longer hold when more than one kind of primary factor i...