This paper employs a stochastic option-pricing models to investigate when should an emerging market engage in financial liberalisation in a framework inwhich policymakers choose an optimal exchange rate target aimed at minimising price volatility and the risk of a debt crisis.

We study a general model of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. We show that one of the bidders has an inform tion advantage over the other bidders if and only if he possesses dominantstrategy. A dominant strategy is in fact unique and is given by the conditional...

Ths authors consider a first-price auction when the ranking of bidders' private valuations is common knowledge among bidders. This new informational framwork is motivated by several applications, from procurement to privatization. It induces a particular asymmetric auction model with affiliated...

The paper studies how second degree price discrimination can be implemented in a duopoly with differentiated products. Two firms serve consumers having heterogeneous willingness to pay for the good, willingness to pay being private knowledge. Consumers choose from a menu of tariffs and are...

The purpose of this paper is to provide an explanation for relative pricing of futures contracts with respect to underlying stocks using a model incorporating short sales constraints and informational lags between the two markets. In this model stocks and futures are perfect substitutes, except...

A durable experience good produced by a monopoly can be of either high or low quality. While some sonsumers are informed of the quality the others are not and have to infer quality through the marketing strategy of the firm. The model is a natural extension of Bagwell and Riordan.

The paper explores second degree price discrimination in a multi- dimensional good context.There are two types of consumers with demand describe by a t wo-dimensional vector,a quantity dimension and a service attribute dimension (mode of usage,usage pattern).

The theory of auctions of a single object generalizes to a situation where identical objects are sold either sequentially or simultaneously but individuals can only buy one object. In this context, I will present a survey of the main results regarding the ranking of auctions based on revenue,...

We study a class of common-value second-price auctions with differential information. This class of common-value auctions is characterized by the property that each player's information set is connected with respect to the common value. We show that the entire class is dominance solvable,...

This paper analysis Competition among sellers over either price negotiation or price posting in the framework of a search model under imperfect information about quality.