Assuming asymmetry across firms and constant unit costs Perloff and Salop (1985) show: If product differentiation increases, the prices rise in a symmetric equilibrium. This raise the question of whether, in general, more product differentiation leads to higher market prices. Giving up the...

A two-stage game is used in this paper to model a long-run market with spatially separated producers and with multi-period demands: first, firmas simultaneously and independently invest their capacities; second, after capacities are set up in the first stage and made public, firms engage in a...

We study oligopoly price competition between multiproduct firms, firms whose products interact in the profitt function. Specifically, we focus on the impact of intra-firm product inter-actions on the level of equilibrium prices and profits.

Long-run oligopolistic expansion behavior in an electricity supply market is modeled in this paper.

In real markets, price adjustment and the matching of buyers and sellers involve considerable exchange of information. Previous experience is also important in partner selection and in the decision to accept a transaction. The dynamic processes involved can be described in terms taken from...

This paper studies utility interdependence in the laboratory. We design an experiment where subjects can reduce ("burn") other subjects' money. Those who burn the money of others have to give up some of their own cash. Despite this cost, and contrary to the assumptions of economics textbooks,...

In most countries, residential electricity consumption typically ranges from 20% to 40% of total electricity consumption. This energy is used for heating, cooling, refrigeration and other end-uses. Significant energy savings are possible if new appliance purchases are for models with higher...

In this paper we study an experiment with human agents strategically interacting in a game characterized by continuous time and continuous strategy space. The research is focused in studying the agents interaction dynamic under different experimental settings. The agents play a two person game...

In market games the one to one correspondence between commodity types and trading posts would be justified if it were true that the set of equilibria is not affected by the number of trading posts postulated at the ouset of the model. We show that this is not true.

It has been shown that if buyers have zero search cost and the remainder a common positive search cost, and sellers post prices, then there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium-sellers choose a price distribution. We show that increasing the number of search cost types results in another...